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GLOBAL ECONOMIC TRENDS DEVELOPMENT AND 
SOCIAL POLICY AT COPENHAGEN PLUS FIVE 
 
I. Introduction: Copenhagen 1995, the financial crisis and the global economic 
outlook 
The World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen in 1995 took place during the 
course of one of the most serious financial crisis in developing economies, namely the 
Mexican crisis of 1994-1995. The significance of that crisis was underlined by the fact that 
it required a huge US-led IMF rescue package of 50 billion US dollars – the largest bail-out 
in the IMF history up to that point. The IMF justified the size of the Mexican assistance on 
the ground that country’s financial melt-down posed a serious danger to the whole world 
monetary system. The Fund believed that the crisis could lead to the imposition of exchange 
controls by Mexico which were most likely then to be imitated by other developing 
countries. This would constitute a grave set-back for the movement towards current and 
capital account liberalization which many developing countries were implementing and 
which the Fund favoured. 
In the event, the Mexican crisis proved to be short-lived at least in terms of restoring 
the stability of the exchange rate (albeit at a much depreciated value) and of the financial 
markets, as well as in broader macro-economic terms. After growing at a rate of 4.4 percent 
p.a. in 1994, Mexican GDP contracted by 6.2 percent in 1995 but in 1996, a positive growth 
rate of 5.2 percent was recorded. Similarly, in Argentina, the economy most affected by the 
contagion from Mexico (hence the name ‘teqila crisis’), the growth rate of GDP declined 
from 8.5 percent p.a. in 1994 to minus 5.8 percent in 1995 and then recovered to a positive 
growth rate of 4.8 percent in 1996.
8
 
For Latin America as a whole, following the crisis, GDP growth declined from 5.2 
percent per annum in 1994 to 1.2 percent in 1995; by 1996 the GDP growth had recovered 
to 3.6 percent p.a. The impact of the crisis on the GDP growth of developing countries as a 
whole was, however minimal. These countries registered an average GDP growth rate of 6.7 
percent p.a. in 1994, 6.1 percent p.a. in 1995 and 6.6 percent p.a. in 1996. 
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the Mexican crisis, the overall prospects at the time of 
Copenhagen 1995 for developing countries and indeed for the whole world economy 
seemed much brighter than they do today. This was due to several factors. Firstly, at that 
time, the East and South East Asian newly industrializing countries (NICs) were continuing 
to achieve historical unprecedented long term rates of economic growth. Even countries in 
                                                 
8
 The data cited in this section comes from IMF (1999). Despite the V-shape economic recovery in Mexico 
many other effects of the financial crisis still continue to influence the economic course of events in the 
country. A cause as well as a consequence of the financial crisis was the banking crisis. The restoration of the 
domestic banking system has required a 60 billion dollars bailout by the Mexican Government. This inevitably 
has raised serious distributional questions and continues to be a source of political controversy. For analyses of 
the Mexican crisis of 1994-95, both theoretical and empirical, see in particular the special issue of the Journal 
of International Economics, Vol. 41, Nos. ¾ November 1996. See also World Bank (1998) and UNCTAD 
(1999). 
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South Asia ,with previous records of moderate growth, for example, India, appeared to be 
successfully moving towards a higher growth path following the adoption of new economic 
policies of liberalization in the early 1990s. Further, in Sub-Saharan Africa by the mid-
1990s, there were strong and promising signs of economic recovery in a number of countries 
after the dismal overall economic performance of that region in the previous decade and in 
the first half of the 1990s. 
Moreover, the global economic outlook which depends basically on economic growth 
in advanced countries because of their far greater weight in the world economy than that of 
developing countries, was much more favourable at the time of the Copenhagen Summit 
1995 than it is today. This was in part because, the US economy at that time was 
experiencing strong economic growth after recovering from the recession of the early 1990s. 
Most analysts agree that the prospects for US economy today are much more clouded 
(because of the enormous current account deficit, a possible stock market bubble the 
unprecedently high indebtedness of the US household sector etc.)
2
 Similarly, the Japanese 
economy in 1995 experienced a growth rate of only 1.5 percent but the country had not yet 
gone into the full blown stagnation and decline of the late 1990s. 
Although the economy of either developing or developed countries is not performing 
as well at Copenhagen plus four as it did in 1995, the policy debate on development issues 
has in many ways marked a definite step forward. The excesses of marketization and the 
adverse consequences of the diminished role of the state are being increasingly recognized 
in the crumbling Washington consensus in the recent period. At the same time however the 
serious financial and economic crises in Asia have cast doubt on the merits of the dirigiste 
Asian model of development for achieving fast economic growth and for catching up with 
the West. 
II. Analytical issues 
It was recognized in the analyses presented at Copenhagen in 1995 that in order to meet the 
Social Summit objectives of poverty reduction and full employment in developing 
countries, it is a necessary condition for the most of these economies to achieve an 
appreciable increase in their trend growth rates of the 1980s and the 1990s.
3
 The East and 
South East Asian NICs were a striking exception to this requirement since they were already 
achieving near double digit rates of long term economic growth. 
The central issue examined in this paper is whether developing countries at 
Copenhagen plus five can expand at a sufficiently fast rate in the medium to long term to 
fulfil the poverty reduction and employment growth goals set in Copenhagen in 1995. It will 
be argued here that such growth rates are certainly feasible on the supply side. Humanity has 
the resources as well as the know-how required to reduce poverty and to provide productive 
jobs for all those who wish to have them. However, for such growth to be actually realized 
this would require an amelioration of the constraints on the rate of growth of real demand in 
developing countries as well as in the world economy as a whole. However, it will be 
suggested here that the removal of these constraints is not just a technical question of 
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 See further UNCTAD (1999); Godley (1999) and Howes and Singh (Forthcoming) 
3
 It is not a sufficient condition since the quality of growth as well as other characteristics of the economy e.g. 
the rate of inflation and fiscal policy remain relevant. These issues are discussed further below. 
 3 
changing fiscal or monetary policies in particular countries but rather of carrying out major 
institutional changes and institutional renewal both within national economies and in the 
world economy as a whole. This is the reason for the emphasis in this paper on the long 
term growth of real demand rather than cyclical movements in nominal demand. 
Indeed throughout this paper the medium to long-term economic trends in developing 
countries are the main objects of analysis rather than the immediate outlook (although that 
also receives some attention). The paper includes the following specific analyses: 
i) It examines the economic record of developing countries in the 1990s in a long 
term historical prospective and outlines the policy issues raised by such an 
analysis. 
ii) It reviews the complex inter-relationship between economic growth; 
unemployment, poverty, reduction and income inequality both conceptually 
and empirically. Special analytical attention is accorded to the notion of full 
employment, to the relationship between technical change and unemployment, 
to the economic significance of the information and communications 
technology and to labour market theories of unemployment and inflation. 
iii) It sets out the changing historical conjuncture for economic development and 
for the development policy debate on the eve of the new millenium. The 
following subjects and related analytical and policy questions in relation to the 
development policy debate receive particular attention: 
a) Liberalization and Globalization: An important question examined here is firstly why, 
contrary to theoretical expectations, the actual experience of many developing 
countries with liberalization and globalization has been negative rather than being 
positive, i.e. it has often resulted in crises rather than faster growth. Secondly, it is 
asked whether these failures are a matter simply of incorrect policies or are there more 
fundamental flaws from the perspective of developing countries with respect to the 
institutional arrangements of the world economy under liberalization and 
globalization. 
b) Washington Consensus: Has the Washington Consensus failed? What lessons should 
be learnt from the operation of that policy programme? What should be the main 
elements of a suitable post Washington Consensus policy programme for developing 
countries ? 
c) Asian Financial and Economic Crises: A very important and influential thesis 
concerning the Asian crisis suggests that the failure of Asian countries during 1997-99 
can be ascribed mainly to the dirigiste and corporatist model of capitalism which 
many of these countries were following. This thesis will be critically examined here. 
It will be appreciated that many of the issues above, although listed under separate headings 
for expository convenience, are analytically inter-connected. These inter-relationships will 
become explicit in the course of the analysis. Further it may be observed that almost any of 
these topics can be the subject of a long treatise; within the confines of a paper, their 
treatment here will necessarily be brief. 
4 
III. Economic development in the south in the 1990s: a long term perspective 
Table 1 to 5 provide comparative information on the economic performance (growth of 
GDP and GDP per capita) of the different parts of the world economy and of the world 
economy as a whole for various periods during the last four decades. The main purpose of 
the exercise is to examine the economic record of the 1990s, in a long term historical 
perspective. The data in these tables comes from three different sources – the IMF, the 
World Bank and UNCTAD. Although the statistics on GDP growth etc. for individual 
countries are broadly compatible between the three agencies, there are some differences 
with respect to the regional groupings and the broader aggregates (mainly because of the 
different countries included in the various groups by the agencies). Wherever these 
differences become relevant will be pointed out in the text.
4
 
The following main points emerge from these tables: 
i) Among developing countries, the East Asian and Pacific economies have been the 
most dynamic group throughout the 30-year period 1965-1996. Not only did this 
group of countries achieve very fast economic growth during 1965-1980, it also 
recorded a trend increase in the 1980s as well as in the 1990s in these already high 
growth rates. It is no exaggeration to say that the sustained economic growth of these 
countries including that of Japan (during second half of this century) is the most 
successful example of fast industrialization and long term growth in the entire history 
of mankind. Singh (1997) notes, in 1955 Korea was unequivocally an industrially 
backward agrarian economy. It was acknowledged to have such little scope for 
development that the US Congress in 1950s denied it funds for developmental 
purposes (Krueger, 1995). Korea’s net value per capita manufacturing output was 8 
US dollars per year compared to the level of 7 US dollars in India and 60 US dollars 
in Mexico. Since than the economy has transformed itself into an industrial giant. It is 
arguably the most advanced country in the world in Electronic Memory Chip 
Technology (DRAM). Before the Asian crisis, Korea expected to become the 4
th
 
largest car producer in the world by the year 2000. It is, therefore, most significant that 
a country with such an outstanding record of economic success for a long period 
should have become so suddenly at the end of 1990s a leading victim of the Asian 
financial crisis. 
ii) It is important to note that between 1965 and 1980, as Table 1 indicates, the Latin 
American economies expanded at a rate not that far below that of the East Asian 
countries – at an average rate of 6 percent p.a. compared with a little over 7 percent 
for the latter group. Indeed as Table 3 demonstrates during that period, the fast 
growing Latin America economies such as Mexico and Brazil could not be 
distinguished statistically from East Asian NICs. However, in the 1980s, “a great 
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 Table 1, based on world bank data, provides long term information on various countries and country-groups 
from mid the 1960s to the mid-1990s (the time of the Copenhagen Summit). Table 2, based on IMF data, gives 
statistics on gdp and on gdp per capita growth for different income and regional groupings from 1990-1998 
and projections for the years 1999 and 2000. Table 3 is on a much more disaggregated basis and covers a 
longer time period for selected the Asian and Latin American countries. Table 4 & 5 report UNCTAD data for 
the 1990s. Table 4 contains aggregate and Table 5 much more disaggregated data for individual developing 
countries in each region including Sub-Saharan Africa as well as the crisis affected Asian countries. The 
remaining tables are self-explanatory.  
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continental divide”5 emerged among developing countries: economic growth 
collapsed in Latin America and in Sub-Saharan Africa during the “lost decade” of 
1980s as a consequence of the debt crisis. However, Asian countries, not only in East 
but also in South Asia continued to prosper. The reasons for the Asian economic 
success and the Latin American failure during the 1980s have been important subjects 
of debate among the development economists. Leading protagonists in this debate 
have been the IMF, the World Bank (1991) and a number of orthodox economists on 
one side, and Taylor(1988), Fishlow(1991) and Singh(1992,1993) on the other. The 
former suggest that the poor economic performance of the Latin American and Sub-
Saharan African countries in the 1980s was essentially due to their own incorrect 
economic policies and structures (including, particularly, an excessive role of the State 
and the lack of openness to the world economy). The latter group of economists have 
however argued that the Latin American and the African failure was basically due to 
the debt crisis which was caused by external shocks outside the control of these 
countries. When these shocks are properly measured, their combined magnitude for 
these countries was much greater than that for the Asian countries.
6
 
iii) In the event, the Latin American countries accepted the orthodox analyses of their 
economic failure and fundamentally changed their economic policies towards the end 
of the 1980s. They adopted the policies of the so-called Washington Consensus and 
greatly reducing the role of the state and enhancing that of the market (including in 
particular that of external markets). Similar policies under the IMF and world bank 
structural adjustment programmes were implemented in African countries. The merits 
and flaws of these policies will be commented upon in section VII below. However, 
an important consequence of this adoption of the orthodox policy package by Latin 
American countries was an enormous expansion of private capital in flows. Having 
been starved of foreign exchange for much of the 1980s the availability of foreign 
private capital (portfolio as well as long term) was of great benefit for the balance of 
payments constrained Latin American economies. This revived economic growth in 
Latin America in the 1990s and notably brought about stabilization after episodes of 
hyper inflation in many countries in the 1980s. 
However, these unregulated, often huge private capital flows proved to be a mixed 
blessing as they led to frequent crisis.
7
 However, by the time of the Copenhagen 
Summit in 1995, many Latin American countries had successfully achieved price 
stabilization but not fast long-term economic growth. The region’s performance in this 
respect during the 1990s has been much below its achievement in the dirigiste pre-
1980 period: as table 2 indicates the growth rate in the 1990s has only been 3.2% 
compared with 6% before 1980. 
The Sub-Saharan African economies have not been favoured by international 
investors so that they have continued to languish in a low level equiliblium trap 
despite all the structural adjustment programmes of the Bretton Woods institutions. 
The African growth rate in the 1990s have hardly improved over that recorded in the 
lost decade of the 1980s. 
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 This the phrase used in Singh (1986). 
6
 See further Taylor (1988), Fishlow (1991), Singh (1992, 1993), World Bank (1991), Krueger (1995), Blassa 
(1986). 
7
 See further Singh and Weiss (1998) 
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iv) China and India. These two countries deserve special mention in this account of 
economic de ian economy has done much better than before achieving an appreciable 
trend increase in its modest growth rates of the 1970s and 1980s. It is highly 
significant that neither country has sucumbed to the recent Asian financial crisis. 
v) As a result of the extraordinary fast economic growth for a prolonged period in East 
Asia, there has been, until the recent financial crisis, a huge improvement in the 
standard of living of the people of the region. Poverty fell sharply between 1975 and 
1995 in many leading East Asian countries (see Table 7). Particularly notable has been 
the achievement of Indonesia where the number of people in poverty (based on $1 per 
person per day poverty line at 1985 PPP prices) fell from over 87 million in 1975 to 
under 22 million in 1985; on the head count index the proportion of people living in 
poverty decreased from 64 percent of the population to 11 percent. Life expectancy at 
the birth, which is normally regarded as a leading indicator of the people’s health and 
quality of life, improved dramatically in Indonesia from 48 to 65 years and it rose 
considerably in all counties of the region. 
A comparative perspective on income-poverty in different developing regions during 
the mid-1990s is provided in Table 8. Table 9 gives a similar analysis of the various 
indicators of human poverty in different regions also, at about the time of the 
Copenhagen summit. Indicators of the gender gap in the different regions are provided 
in Table 10. It is interesting to observe that among developing countries, East Asia 
(excluding China) has the highest value of the gender-related development index, 
whilst South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa record the lowest. 
Table 11 provides information on living standards, poverty and real wages in Latin 
America between 1980 and 1995. The Table shows that despite economic recovery in 
Latin American countries in the 1990s, real wages in manufacturing had not recovered 
by 1995 to their 1980 level. Real minimum wages in 1995 were 30 percent below the 
1980 level. The percentage of the poor households rose from 35 during 1980 to 39 in 
1990s after having fallen for many years up to 1980. Other important information in 
this Table about employment and unemployment and the informal sector will be 
commented on in the next section. 
vi) How does the Asian economic and financial crisis affect the prospects for economic 
growth and poverty reduction for various groups of developing countries and for the 
world economy as a whole? The data presented earlier in Table 1-5 suggests that 
advanced economies, particularly the US was hardly hit at all by the Asian economic 
crisis. Indeed, there are reasons to suggest that the US economy may have gained from 
the crisis both by the flight of capital to the US in its aftermath as well as by an 
improvement in the terms of trade following the massive currency depreciations of the 
East Asian currencies. This is widely thought to have contributed to containing 
inflation in the US despite the high level of activity in the economy
9
. 
Turning to the crisis-affected Asian countries, these have clearly sustained huge losses 
to their real economies (see Table 5). In 1998, GDP in Indonesia fell by 14 percent, in 
Thailand by 8 percent, in ASEAN-4 as a whole by 9 percent and by over 5 percent 
each in Korea and Singapore. However the recovery of these economies has followed 
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a V-shape pattern, mentioned earlier with respect to Mexico in relation to the Tequila 
crisis of 1995. Thus, even as early as 1999, South Korea is expected to have a positive 
growth of 6 percent; Malaysia of 2 percent in 1999 and over 6 percent in the year 
2000; Thailand of nearly 4 percent in 1999 and in 2000. Even Indonesia, which 
suffered not just a huge economic loss as a result of the crisis but in effect a 
disintegration of its social fabric, is expected to have a positive growth of over 3 
percent in the year 2000. (These are the most recent IMF projections and are subject to 
the qualifications noted in section I concerning the downside risks with respect to the 
future course particularly of the US economy.
9
) 
Latin American countries have poorer prospects during the next two years because 
they have not only been affected by the contagion from the Asian financial crisis but 
also most significantly from those of Russia and Brazil. Many Latin American 
countries took pre-emptive action to avoid the financial crisis by raising real interest 
rates. As a consequence the rate of growth of GDP in Latin America as a whole fell 
from 5.2 percent in 1997 to 2.3 percent in 1998 and –0.5 percent in 1999. IMF 
projections forecast a moderate growth rate of 3 percent in 2000, well below the long-
term trend growth of 6 percent before the debt crisis of the 1980s. 
With respect to the social consequences of the Asian crisis, as expected, there have 
been important negative affects of the contraction of the real economy in the crisis- 
affected countries on people’s standard of living, unemployment, real wages, poverty 
and other social variables. These effects have been extensively studied in World 
Bank(1998), ILO-ARTEP (1999), Singh (1999), and ILO(1999). The World Bank 
group’s most recent projections on the impact of the crisis on poverty in three affected 
Asian countries are summarised in Table 12. The group estimates that the number of 
people in poverty in East Asia fell from 440 million in 1993 to 345 million in 1995. It 
observes that this improvement almost certainly continued up to the time of crisis. The 
financial crisis put an end to the long period of rapid growth and led to the significant 
increase in poverty indicated in Table 12
10
. 
vii) Despite all the setbacks of the lost decade of the 1980s in Latin America and Africa, 
of the Tequila crisis in the mid 1990s and the Asian crisis at the end of 1990s, 
developing countries have in general made enormous economic and social progress. 
Overall economic growth has not been as rapid during the last twenty years as it was 
in the “golden age” of the South’s development between 1950 and 1980.11 
Nevertheless, during the last half century, economic development in the South has led 
to major changes in the structure of the world economy as well as in their own 
national economic structures. At the beginning of the period, the global economy 
divided itself more or less neatly into two group of countries: one which were major 
producers and exporters of manufactures of capital goods and technology (the North), 
and the other which were major producers and exporters of agriculture and raw 
materials (the South). As a consequence of industrialisation and of fast economic 
growth, particularly in the Asian NICs, the structure of the world economy on the eve 
of new millenium is radically different. Many developing countries today have 
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 The date in this paragraph comes from “The Economist”, Sep. 25-Oct 1, 1999, p.136. 
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 See further World Bank (1999). 
 
11
 For stimulating analysis of the South’s economic performance during this period, see Patel (199 ?) 
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become important producers and exporters of manufactured products (see Table 13). 
Although the North is still the major exporter and producer of technology and capital 
goods, it no longer has a monopoly. In relation to the Copenhagen Summit, however, 
the important policy question is whether developing countries have undergone 
adequate structural change and acquired the necessary capabilities for rapid economic 
progress in order to meet the employment and poverty reduction objectives of the 
Summit. For this purpose it is necessary to study the relationship between economic 
growth, poverty, employment and inequality, a subject to which we turn in the next 
section. 
IV. Economic Growth, Unemployment, Poverty and Income Inequality 
There are complex inter-relationships between economic growth, employment and 
unemployment, poverty and income distribution. These inter-relationships require careful 
conceptual and empirical analysis in order to draw useful conclusions for policy. 
IV(a) Copenhagen Declaration and Full Employment 
Commitment 3 of the Copenhagen Declaration enjoined participating nations to 
commit themselves to the goal of full employment and to pursue policies and programmes 
which would help achieve this objective. 
This affirmation of the commitment to full employment is significant for several 
reasons. Firstly, there is close relationship between employment and poverty reduction both 
at the micro and macro–economic levels. At the micro-economic level, a reasonably 
remunerative job may help to keep a family above the poverty line. At the macro-economic 
level, the relationship between employment and poverty is more complex as it is mediated 
through a third variable, namely economic growth. It will be indicated below how fast 
economic growth may help both to reduce poverty and to increase employment. 
The second reason, why the full employment commitment of Copenhagen 1995 is 
important is summed up well by the President of the World Bank Mr James Wolfensohn: 
“While microeconomic management is never perfect – there will always be 
some fluctuations in output and employment – the most effective safety net is 
a policy which maintains full employment. Deep recessions and depressions 
have adverse effects on virtually every one of the elements of the 
development strategy: health deteriorates, schooling is interrupted and 
poverty increases. Formal safety nets are but an imperfect stop gap measure 
in addressing the failures of effective macro policies to maintain the 
economy at full employment”. 
Thirdly, employment is important not only because of its relationship to poverty but 
also because unemployment leads to social exclusion and is deeply damaging to the status of 
the citizen. It lowers self-esteem, is demotivating and results in social degradation. There is 
also evidence that it is injurious to health and may increase criminality.
12
 As OECD (1994) 
                                                 
12
 See further OECD (1994), Clark and Oswald (1994) 
 9 
observed with respect to current mass unemployment in industrial countries that apart from 
being an enormous economic waste, high levels of unemployment bring about 
“unravelling of the social fabric including a loss of authority of the 
democratic system and it risks resulting in the disintegration of the 
international trading system”. 
Fourthly, as implied in the OECD statement, emphasis on employment is also 
important from an international perspective. Both rich and poor countries are presently 
faced with enormous employment challenges, although these take different forms in the two 
groups of countries. It will be argued in this paper that the first best solution to this common 
North South concern lies in international cooperation between the North and South.  
Fifthly, there is an intellectual reason for welcoming Copenhagen commitment to full 
employment. There is wide spread pessimism not only among the public at large but also 
among professional economists that full employment is no longer a practical proposition. 
Changes in the nature of work and technology are thought to have made the concept of full 
employment obsolete. This thesis will be challenged below. 
IV(b) Economic Growth, Full Employment and Poverty 
The first question which arises here is what constitutes full employment. In this 
respect, there are difficult but rather different, conceptual as well as empirical issues, both 
for advanced and for developing countries. In case of advanced countries, many economists 
define full employment in terms of the ‘natural rate of unemployment’ or the ‘non-
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment’ (NAIRU). However, this involves mixing 
together two related but independent objectives of full employment and price stability.
13
 
Following Beveridge, full employment is best viewed as the absence of involuntary 
unemployment. In more practical terms Beveridge (1944) suggested that full employment 
exists only when unfilled vacancies are somewhat greater than the numbers unemployed and 
that “jobs are at fair wages, of such a kind and so located that the unemployed men can be 
expected to take them”. 
For developing countries, the concept of full employment raises even thornier issues. 
This is largely because of the fact that most of these countries do not possess a system of 
social insurance against unemployment. Consequently, the measured rate of unemployment 
tends to be quite low because without social security, people are obliged to work regardless 
of how productive or remunerative the work may be. Therefore, in developing countries, 
involuntary unemployment normally takes the form of either under-employment or low 
productivity work in the informal sector. Therefore, to assess whether the Copenhagen goal 
of full employment in developing countries is being met, requires a comprehensive and 
nuanced analysis of employment, unemployment, underemployment, productivity growth as 




In analytical terms it may be useful to think about the relationship between economic 
growth and employment in the following way. Abstracting from cyclical considerations, for 
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there to be long-term full employment, employment would need to expand at much the same 
rate as the labour force, say ‘n’. Further if it is also desired that there should be a steady 
increase in real wages and productivity at the rate ‘p’, then output must grow approximately 
at a rate of ‘n +p’. A growth rate below (n + p) would result either in less than full 
employment, or a fall in the rate of growth of productivity, or a combination of the two. In 
developing countries reduced economic growth often leads to a fall in productivity rather 
than decrease in employment because of the existence of the informal sector. The latter is 
characterised by more or less fully flexible labour market. Informal sector acts as a sponge 
to absorb labour, leading to reduced productivity and low quality jobs. On the other hand in 
the formal sector, because of the relatively less flexible labour market, lower economic 
growth leads to reduction in employment rather than lower real wages and productivity. 
Indeed informal sector employment may increase rather than decrease in response to a 
reduction in the rate of growth of production (owing, say to an external shock). This is for 
two reasons: the unemployed from the formal sector may enter the informal sector leading 
to a reduction in productivity and real wages; because of lower real wages the participation 
rate in the informal sector increases further as families attempt to maintain their standard of 
living. 
Evidence from developing countries on output, employment and productivity growth 
is compatible with this conceptualization of segmented labour markets and the behavioral 
distinction between the formal and informal sectors. Thus as Table 11 earlier indicated 
lower long-term economic growth in Latin American in the 1980s and 1990s (following the 
debt crisis) has resulted both in reduced real wages and productivity growth and a huge 
increase in informal employment. Tokman(1997) notes that 80 percent of the new jobs in 
Latin America during 1985 to 1995 have been in the informal sector. 
The experience of the fast growing Asian economies during the 1980s and 1990s but 
prior to the financial crisis stand in striking contrast to that of the Latin American countries. 
As Table 11a suggests that in the Asian countries with much faster economic growth, 
employment as well as real wages expanded at a very fast rate of almost 5 percent per 
annum. Further the formal sector expanded at the expense of informal sector, and a number 
of these hitherto labour surplus economies became significant net importers of labour from 
neighbouring countries. 
The above analysis has the following implications for the Copenhagen Summit 
objective of ‘full employment’ in developing countries. Labour force in the South as a 
whole is on average growing at a rate of about 3 percent per annum- more so in Latin 
America and Sub-Saharan Africa and less in Asia. Apart from providing jobs for those who 
are presently involuntarily unemployed and underemployed, much the bigger challenge is to 
create sufficient productive work and remunerative employment opportunities for this fast 
growing labour force. On the basis of past statistical data it has been estimated that in order 
to meet this challenge, GDP in developing countries would need to grow at the rate of 5 to 6 
percent per annum. In view of the fact that on average the share of labour in national income 
is about 50 percent in developing countries, this rate of growth will imply constancy of 
factor shares. It will also imply a long-term growth of productivity and real wages of the 
order of 2-3 percent per annum. 
Fast economic growth should therefore not only lead to more jobs but also more 
productive and remunerative jobs i.e. better jobs. This would help reduce poverty directly. 
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In addition to lowering poverty through the creation of good jobs, fast economic 
growth also helps reducing it in other important indirect ways. Economic growth generates 
increased government revenues, which makes it possible for there to be spent on health, 
education and other poverty reducing measures. Empirically, there is a well established 
relationship between economic growth and poverty. Ravallion (1995) estimated that in the 
late 1980s the elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to growth in mean incomes 
(assuming distributional neutrality) was 3.5 in Malaysia 3.5 in Thailand 2.8 in Indonesia, 
less than 2 in most of the Sub-Saharan Africa and less than 1 in Brazil. Further Morlay’s 
(1994) study shows that poverty rose in 55 of the 58 recessions in Latin America during the 
1980s it fell or remained unchanged in 25 of 32 recoveries. 
The reason, why the income elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to economic 
growth varies between countries is because research suggests that there are variables other 
than growth which also affect poverty. The most important of these are: (a) Inflation and 
particularly unanticipated inflation; (b) Inequality of income distribution ; (c) Public 
expenditure; (d) Stability of economic growth; (e) Initial distribution of land and other 
assets (including human, e.g. education). With respect to inflation, World Bank (1998) 
rightly suggests that high and variable inflation (i.e. unanticipated inflation) is particularly 
damaging to the poor who lack both institutional and market mechanisms for protecting 
their consumption. Workers are obliged to accept large wage cuts, unemployment and low 
paid jobs in the informal sector because of the absence of the social safety nets. 
Evidence presented in section III suggested that fast growing Asian countries were 
able to greatly increase the standard of living of the people and reduce poverty up to the 
time of Asian crisis, the stagnant or slow growing economies in Latin America, on the other 
hand, during the 1980s and the 1990s registered increased poverty. The World Bank has 
recently estimated the GDP growth rates required by different developing regions to meet 
the international development target of poverty reduction which is to reduce by half the 
number of absolutely poor people (people living below US dollar one a day) in 1985 prices 
in the world by the year 2015. (see table 13a).The Bank economics noted that with pre-
Asian crisis GDP growth rates, and assuming no rise in inequality, most of the world was on 
track to achieve the international development target. However following the Asian crisis 
the projected GDP growth rates for 1997-2000 for most regions are below required rates. 
The East Asian growth rate was adequate before the crisis but it may not be sufficient to 
make up for the increase in poverty caused by the crisis.
15
 
IV(c) Economic Growth, Technical change and Employment 
It is commonly believed that the fast pace of technical progress and a change in the 
nature of technology have been the major causes of unemployment both in advanced and 
developing countries. It is further suggested by many economists that economic growth no 
longer leads to more jobs, but rather to no jobs at all, even to a reduction in jobs
12
, i.e.; the 
employment elasticity of growth is zero or negative. The technology thesis as well as that of 
jobless growth have been examined in details in ILO (1995) and Singh (1995,1999). This 
research shows that neither of these hypothesis is compatible with available evidence. The 
most important points with respect to advanced countries may be summarized as follows: 
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(1) Although there is evidence to suggest that there has indeed been an acceleration in 
technical progress because of the information and communication technology (ICT) 
revolution, at a broad macroeconomic level, the huge increase in unemployment 
observed in industrialized countries cannot be attributed to the faster pace of 
technological change. This is because there has been a trend fall rather than a trend 
increase in average productivity growth in advance countries. The evidence suggests 
that the growth rate required in industrial countries before their economies start 
creating net new jobs has been less in the period 1974 to 1995 than during 1960 to 
1973 (ILO, 1995). What this indicates is that the potential of new technology is not 
being realised, and being transferred into faster productivity growth, as one would 
normally expect. 
(2) Econometric evidence for a cross section of advanced industrial countries suggests an 
increase over time in the employment elasticity of output growth rather than a 
decrease as the hypotheses of the jobless growth imply (Boltho and Glyn 1995). 
With respect to developing countries which generally are not using the most advanced 
technology in any case, there is no systematic evidence of a fall in employment elasticity of 
economic growth over time. There are nevertheless apparent anomalies, which require 
comment. First there is evidence for the Latin American countries that despite the revival of 
economic growth in the 1990s employment in the formal sector has increased very little. 
Frankel (1998) ascribes this phenomenon to greater competition following the liberalization 
of trade in Latin American countries in the recent period in accordance with the policies of 
the ‘Washington Consensus’. Similarly the apparent recent decline in employment elasticity 
of manufacturing growth in the formal sector in India can plausibly be ascribed to previous 
overmanning due to lack of competition. Although the Indian economy is still relatively 
much more closed to outward competition than that of the Latin American countries, there 
has been extensive internal liberalization in India, which could produce the observed 
outcome. These issues however require further research. 
It is nevertheless important to reflect on the fact that the scholars of technical change 
regard the present ICT technology on par with the major technological revolutions of the 
last two centuries, such as steam engine and electricity (Freeman 1999). The significance of 
ICT technology derives in part from the fact that it can be widely used in many different 
spheres of the economy as is the case with electricity and steam engine. However, the ICT 
technology cannot only be used as an input to various industries, but unlike electricity, it 
also has an ever-increasing number of direct outputs (e.g. internet). More important the 
trend rate of growth of productivity of ICT technology has been far faster than that of 
previous technological innovations. ICT productivity has been increasing at a phenomenal 
rate of 25 percent per annum over the past two decades. Whereas it took 50 years for the 
price of electricity to be halved from the time of its first commercial use, in case of ICT 
such price reduction has been achieved in a fraction of that time. The classical illustration of 
the phenomenon is that a computer that cost ten million dollars in 1980 would cost less than 
two thousand dollars today to provide the same computing power. From the perspective of 
economic development the important point is that a huge new resource is now available 
which in principal capable of benefiting the whole humanity and raising its standard of 
living, but its potential is not being fully utilized. 
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IV(d) Flexible Labour Markets 
It is important to note that the analysis of employment in terms of economic growth as 
outlined above is only one of the several different analytical approaches to the employment 
question
13
. Orthodox economists look at this issue usually from the perspective of the 
flexibility of the labour market- the NAIRU approach. There is a vast literature on the 
subject mostly concerned with advanced economies
14
. However the international agencies, 
following this approach, draw the same policy implications from the analysis for developed 
as for developing countries. Unemployment as well as other unfavourable labour market 
outcomes are ascribed to imperfections and the lack of flexibility in labour markets. As a 
cure-all, both advanced and developing countries are asked to carry out labour market 
reforms in order to make them more flexible. 
Stiglitz (1997), Eisner (1999), Solow (1994), Galbraith (1997) and Howes and Singh 
(forthcoming) among others have pointed out the serious theoretical as well empirical 
difficulties with respect to the NAIRU approach. Nevertheless as it has been widely adopted 
for policy purposes particularly by the Bretton Wood institutions; it may be useful to review 
here some of the empirical evidence which is not compatible with the NAIRU thesis. 
(1) Considering developing countries first, unfavourable labour market outcomes in sub-
Saharan Africa or Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s described earlier can hardly 
be attributed to imperfections or rigidities in their labour markets. There is enough 
empirical evidence, which suggests that even though these markets may suffer from 
many rigidities and imperfections at any point of time, they have proved to be 
dynamically highly flexible. For example, in Mexico real wages fell by more than 50 
percent in the 1980s following the debt crisis of the 1990s. With the resumption of 
economic growth in the 1990s, real wages rose. Similar movements in real wages and 
economic activities have also occurred in other Latin American and in sub-Saharan 
African countries. 
(2) The different labour market outcomes between Latin American and Asian economies 
summarized in Table 11 and 11a would also be difficult to ascribe to differences in the 
flexibility of the labour markets in the two regions. Real wages rose in leading Asian 
NICs at a fast rate of nearly 5 percent per annum between 1980 and 1990; 
manufacturing employment did not however fall on account of rising real wages but in 
fact recorded an appreciable increase (again at a rate of about 5 percent per annum). 
Similarly in Latin America both real wages and employment fell during the 1980s. 
These observed positive relationships between real wages and employment in the 
Latin American and Asian countries run contrary to labour market approaches to the 
employment question as these would suggest a negative relationship between the two 
variables. 
(3) With respect to advanced economies, the proponents of the labour market flexibility 
doctrine set great store by the fact that unemployment rate in Europe is much higher 
than that in United States. This is ascribed to more flexible labour markets in the US 
compared with Europe. This view however is oversimplified as is suggested by the 
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data on unemployment rates in industrial countries over the longer time period (for the 
last four decades) presented in Table 14a. The Table shows that German 
unemployment rate during the ten-years period 1964 to 1973 was on average only 1.1 
percent of the labour force. The corresponding US rate at the time was over 4 percent. 
The German labour market was anything relatively much less flexible during this 
period compared with US labour market than it is today. The generally superior 
European performance with respect to employment in the 1960s and early 1970s 
compared with the US was due to the fact that these economies were growing at that 
time at a much faster rate than the US economy
15
. 
NAIRU type labour market theories of employment and inflation have similar 
difficulties in explaining long term changes in these variables in industrial countries. Thus 
during the 1930s the labour market were highly flexible yet that period was characterized by 
mass unemployment and low inflation. The ‘golden age’ of the 1950s and 1960s provided 
more or less full employment in the West European economies for nearly a quarter century 
and yet the inflation rate remained low. Most recently the US has been able to have very low 




The evidence outlined above, together with the analytical work referred to earlier 
suggest that theories of labour market flexibility do not provide an adequate or a robust 
foundation for policies to tackle unemployment. 
IV(e) Inequality, Poverty and Growth 
The question of inequality has received very little attention from economists over the 
last two decades. There are subtle ideological and sociological reasons for this neglect, 
which however need not detain us here
17
. More significantly, from the perspective of this 
paper, at a policy level this omission have been justified on the ground that income 
distribution for most countries remains stable for long periods. Therefore for short to 
medium term policy analysis, this variable can be assumed to be given and policy makers 
can concentrate on questions of growth and poverty reduction
18
. 
This argument however has serious limitations as has been rightly pointed out by 
Kanbur and Lustig (1999). Firstly, it is incorrect to assume that income inequality remains 
stable over time. Empirical evidence from a wide range of countries with reliable data for 
the last decade suggests considerable changes in the gini coefficient over the brief period of 
ten years
19
. Secondly even if gini coefficient remained stable, the neglect of income 
distribution will not be a correct approach to policy. This is because actual policy measures 
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to promote growth and poverty reduction have distributional consequences, even in the short 
run, which cannot just be ignored
20
. 
Turning to the relationship between inequality and growth, this is both theoretically 
and empirically controversial. A priori the relationship between two variables can be 
modeled in a number of different ways, most of which are plausible. Empirically, the 
experience of East Asian countries has received a great deal of attention in this literature. 
These countries have managed to achieve, as seen earlier, historically unprecedented 
sustained fast growth; they have however also evidently enjoyed much more equal income 
distribution than most countries; the significant point here is that fast economic growth does 
not appear to have worsened income distribution. The issue nevertheless remains 
controversial. Singh(1995a) has observed that although income distribution may not have 
become more unequal, there is evidence as well as good reasons to suggest that the wealth 
distribution in these countries has worsened over time. If this hypothesis is confirmed in 
further work, it has important implications for the political economy interpretations of East 
Asian success. 
IV(f) Summary 
To sum up this section has examined the interrelationship between economic growth 
and employment, poverty and income distribution. It has attempted to cast light on the 
complexities of the interrelationships between these variables which policy makers need to 
take into account. With respect to Copenhagen Summit central policy implication of the 
analysis is that developing countries need to achieve a trend increase in their growth rates, 
possibly to their pre-1980 long-term rates of about 6 percent per annum. This would enable 
them to maintain meaningful ‘full employment’ in the spirit of Copenhagen Summit with 
rising real wages and increasing standards of living. Although faster growth will help to 
reduce poverty, the latter is affected by other important variables as well-notably inflation, 
inequality of income distribution, instability of economic growth and fiscal policies of the 
government. Women particularly are adversely affected by the macroeconomic instability as 
in the absence of adequate social security systems, the burden of women’s paid as well as 
unpaid work increases in economic downturns
21
. So what is required for meeting the 
employment and poverty reduction goals of the Copenhagen 1995 is fast growth but also 
better quality growth as outlined above. 
A very important analytical and policy question is whether such a trend increase in 
economic growth is possible for developing countries under the new institutional 
arrangements of liberalization and globalization of world economy. This question will be 
taken up in last section. Before that other issues in the development policy debate relating to 
liberalization and globalization, the reasons for Asian crisis, the ‘Washington consensus’ 
and new international financial architecture will be briefly reviewed. 
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V. Changing Historical Conjuncture and the Development Policy Debate 
It was seen earlier that developing countries as a whole achieved unparallel material 
progress between 1950 and 1980, growing at an average rate of 6 per cent per annum. Since 
this “Golden Age” the average growth rate has been slower, mainly due to the debt crisis in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America in the lost decade of the 1980s and the economic and 
financial crises in Latin America and Asia in 1990s. It is important to appreciate that the 
Golden Age of South’s development between 1950 and 1980 took place during a 
particularly propitious historical conjuncture: 
i) the advanced industrial countries were in the period 1950-73 experiencing an 
unprecedented boom, their own golden age. During this quarter century West 
European economies grew at a rate of nearly 5 per cent per annum, which was twice 
the rate that they had ever experienced before for any sustained period over the 
previous two centuries. As seen earlier, not only did they experience more or less full 
employment over this long period but countries like Germany and France had over-




ii) There was contention between two systems: the liberal democratic capitalist West and 
the single-party planned economy regimes in Eastern Europe and the USSR. This 
contention provided space for developing countries to pursue their own 
industrialisation projects, often with tangible assistance from both sides in the cold 
war. 
iii) The global economic environment, in part, shaped by these forces was also very 
helpful to developing countries. Not only did the US-led world monetary and financial 
system, subject to regulation by capital controls, provided a stable framework for 
expansion of trade, the trading system itself was in many ways positively helpful to 
developing countries. Although the latter complained at the time about the inequities 
of the trading regime, the truth of the matter is that GATT provided a more favourable 
environment for industrialisation in developing countries than any system before or 
since. The industrial countries, for example agreed to the principle of discrimination 
against themselves, in the sense that developing countries (including Japan upto the 
late 1960s) , were allowed to restrict imports from developed countries while being 
given much freer access to restrict their exports.
23
 
iv) The rules of the game also permitted developing countries to pursue national 
industrial policies which enabled many of them to create a substantial export capacity, 
further assisting their industrialisation.
24
 
During the last 20 years and on the eve of the new millenium, this situation has 
changed dramatically. In particular: 
1. Not only has the cold war come to an end, but the new trading regime under the WTO 
has whittled away the concept of special and differential treatment for developing 
countries and enshrined instead the concept of reciprocity and national treatment. This 
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will make it progressively more difficult for developing countries to use protection or 
state industrial policy as instruments of industrialisation.
25
 
2. The internal and external financial liberalisation which began with the industrial 
countries in the 1970s has been increasingly emulated by developing countries during 
the 1980s and 1990s, often under the structural adjustment programmes imposed by 
the Bretton Woods Institutions. There have also been other parallel movements in the 
domestic economies of both developing and developed countries which has enhanced 
greatly the role of the market and seriously diminished that of the state- through 
deregulation, privatisation and liberalisation of the product, labour and capital 
markets. 
3. The project of liberalisation and globalisation which essentially consists of free trade 
and free capital movements has, in the recent, made rapid progress in incorporating 
developing countries, partly as a result of the debt crisis of the 1980s and the fall of 
the Soviet Union in 1989. It may be further assisted by the apparent failure of state 
directed capitalism in the recent Asian crisis. Thus, Alan Greenspan, the respected 
chairman of the US Federal Reserve has observed as follows in relation to the Asian 
financial crisis: “…in the last decade or so, the world has observed a consensus 
towards, a want of a better term, the Western form of free-market capitalism as the 
model which should govern how each individual country should run its economy… 
We saw the breakdown on the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the massive shift away from 
central planning towards free market capitalist types of structures. Concurrent to that 
was a really quite dramatic, very strong growth in what appeared to be a competing 
capitalist-type system in Asia. And as a consequence of that, you had developments of 
types of structures which I believe at the end of the day were faulty but you could not 
demonstrate that so long as growth was going at 10 percent a year”. 
4. So, as we enter the 21st century, developing countries are faced with a powerful thesis 
that there is only one form of economic organisation which is viable in the long run, 
namely the liberal capitalism of the anglo-saxon variety. This thesis is being 
increasingly accepted by the international community, in part, because of the 
overwhelming US hegemony in international politics and economics in a uni-polar 
world. Hence the emphasis, for example, in the leading proposals for a new 
international financial architecture on transparency, competition policy, on changes in 




The question for Copenhagan 2000 will be whether these proposed new institutional 
arrangements strengthening liberalisation and globalisation are likely to help or to hinder the 
achievement of the Summit goals of full employment and poverty reduction. This question 
will be answered, first, indirectly below, by reviewing some of the main issues in the 
evolving development policy debate . It will then be taken up directly in the last section. 
                                                 
25
 See, however, Singh (1997). 
26
 See further Chang and Singh (1999). 
18 
VI. World Economic Integration under Liberalisation and Globalisation 
The proponents of liberalisation and globalisation claim that these help the integration 
of world economy which, in turn, generates fast economic growth (through better allocation 
of resources, promotion of technical change on account of greater competition, among other 
factors). Many economists also suggest that free trade and capital movements lead to 
convergence of real wages and productivity between and within countries (Sachs and 
Warmer, 1995). 
Table 15 summarises information on the integration of the world economy during the 
last four decades through trade, FDI flows and bank loans. An important point that emerges 
from this table is that the world economy was integrating quite rapidly even before 
liberalisation and globalisation. The volume of world exports expanded at a far faster rate 
during 1964-73 than they have during the 1980s and 1990s. Since world real GDP also 
expanded at a much faster rate during 1964-73 than it has done subsequently, this suggests 
that the causation may run from growth of production to growth of trade rather than the 
other way round. Information given in table 16 and 17 lends some further support to this 
point. The two tables suggest that the tariffs and the non-tariff barriers to trade have been 
declining in Latin America and East Asia since 1980; In the early 1980s, these were twice as 
high as in the early 1990s in the two regions. These are likely to have been higher still 
during the period 1964-73. Not withstanding these greater restrictions on trade, the latter 
expanded at a much faster rate in that period than it has done subsequently, suggesting that 
faster growth has led to faster trade rather than the other way round. 
Thus it is not the case that during the last two decades the pace of world economic 
integration has increased but that it has taken a new form under the regime of freer trade and 
capital flows represented by liberalisation and globalisation. The main stylised facts about 
the new form of world economic integration are:
27
 
1. Private capital flows have replaced multilateral and bilateral aid to developing 
countries as the main vehicle of capital transfer from rich to poor countries. Between 
1984-89 and 1990-96, net official flows fell by nearly 50 percent while net private 
flows rose by 700 percent. 
2. There has been a huge increase in portfolio flows as well as FDI during the last 15 
years. Portfolio equity flow were negligible in the 1970s and 1980s, expanded rapidly 
in the 1990s and comprised about 15 percent of the total capital flows in 1996. 
3. FDI and portfolio flows have, however, gone only to a very small number of 
developing countries. Fourteen countries accounted for 95 percent of private flows to 
developing countries. 
4. Even those countries who have been major recipients of private capital inflows in the 
recent period have helped to contend with the high volatility of these flows, which 
have invariably proved to be highly disruptive. 
However, the experience of both developed and developing countries under 
liberalisation and globalisation has so far been disappointing. As Feelix (1996) and Singh 
(1997) note, leading industrial countries have been operating under a regime of more or less 
free trade and more or less free movements of capital since the early 1980s. However, 
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contrary to apriori expectations, the performance of the real economy during this period has 
been less than impressive as is indicated by the following facts: 
 GDP growth in the 1980s and 1990s under liberalisation is much lower than that 
achieved in the illiberal and regulated golden age of the 1950s and 1960s. 
 There has been a comprehensive failure of GDP growth in the later period: 21 out of 
22 OECD countries had a lower GDP growth in the second period compared to the 
first. 
 There has also been during this period much greater variability of both financial 
variables, such as the exchange rates, and real variables such as GDP and its 
components. 
 Productivity growth during the 1980s and 1990s has been half of what it was in the 
golden age. 
 The critical failure, however, is with respect to employment: many European countries 




Turning to developing countries, Rodrik (1999) has carried out the closest direct test 
of the hypothesis that capital account liberalisation in these countries leads to fast economic 
growth or that capital controls diminish economic performance. This cross section study 
based on a sample of 100 countries over the period 1975-89, finds no relationship between 
the capital account regime and the following three indicators of economic performance: a) 
per capita GDP growth, b) investment in GDP ratio and c) inflation. Further Sachs and 
Warner’s (1995) influential study of the time that economic openness leads to faster 
economic growth has been sharply criticised by Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999), particularly 
on the grounds that the measures of openness used by Sachs and Warner are flawed. Indeed 
the IMF which is a strong advocate of free trade and free capital movements, itself arrives at 
the following overall assessment of the empirical evidence on this question: “These studies 
provide useful insights into the concequences of capital account liberalisation. At best, 
however, they provide mixed support for the hypothesis that capital account liberalisation 
has a positive effect on economic growth” 
In principle, free capital movements should smoothe out income and consumption 
over time for individuals and countries, but in practice, the experience has been quite the 
opposite. Financial liberalisation, both in developed and developing countries (particularly 
the latter) has invariably been associated with financial crisis (see further Demirguc-Kunt 
and Detragiache, 1998; World Bank, 1998; IMF, 1998). Similarly, the Sachs and Warner 
proposition that economic integration through free trade and capital movements leads to 
convergence has found little support in more recent work (see, for example, Rodriguez and 
Rodrik ,1999; Slaughter, 1998; UNCTAD, 1997). Using superior empirical methodology, 
Slaughter concludes that the main empirical result of his analysis is that “trade liberalisation 
did not trigger convergence in any of the four cases (which he studied). If anything, trade 
seems to have caused income divergence. 
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Why hasn’t the liberal economy delivered? Why is there such divergence between 
theoretical expectation and empirical reality? This subject has received a great deal of 
attention from economists in the last decade or so. As Chakravarty and Singh (1988) noted, 
the case for trade openness is in principle very robust. Advantages of openness go much 
beyond the comparitive static benefits of trade emphasised an orthodox analysis. Trade 
openness may also benefit the economy in one or more of the following ways: 
1. It may enable a country to concentrate its relatively specialised resources in areas of 
production where the world demand is highly income and price elastic. 
2. It may lead to diffusion of knowledge which can bring about considerable upgrading 
of the quality of local factors of production. 
3. It may lead to increased competitive pressure which may eliminate Leibenstein’s X-
inefficiency. 
4. Trade may lead to changes in income distribution which can resolve in bringing about 
greater share of investment in national output. 
5. Openness can accelerate a Schumpeterian process of creative destruction and thereby 
generate faster economic growth. 
However, for these benefits to be realised, the role of the government and the question 
of coordination failures is critical. Evidence from the outstanding economic success of East 
Asian economies indicate the positive role of the government in institutionalising learning 
from the outside world through trade (see further Freeman, 1989; Aoki et al, 1998; 
Singh,1995a and 1999). Further, the free trade model assumes that there is always full 
employment in all participating countries, a very tall order indeed in the real world. John 
Mayard Keynes was concerned with the possibilities of coordination failures at the 
international level leading to sub-optimal equilibrium of world demand, output and 
employment. He observed: 
“the problem of maintaining equilibrium in the balance of payments between 
countries has never been solved….the failure to solve the problem has been a 
major cause of impoverishment and social discontent and even of wars and 
revolutions…to suppose that there exists some smoothly functioning 
automatic mechanism of adjustment which preserves equilibrium only if we 
trust to matters of laissez faire is a doctrinaire delusion which disregards the 
lessons of historical experience without having behind it the support of sound 
theory”. (Moggridge, 1980) 
During the 1950s and 1960s in industrial countries, the problem of payments 
imbalances between countries was resolved at high rates of growth of world demand, output 
and employment. This is not been the case under financial deregulation and freer 
movements of capital. Theoretical work on financial flows indicate that the case for free 
movements of capital is far from being robust. ‘Free trade’ in financial instruments is 
fundamentally different from free trade in goods. This is because the former is subject to 
asymmetric information, agency problems and adverse selection. Some of these problems 
can occur in trade in goods as well. But they are central to finance. Moreover, in the 
orthodox model, price formation in financial markets, such as the currency or the stock 
markets are based on rational expectations; the model assumes that the prices generated by 
this process are always “fundamentally efficient” in Tobin’s (1984) sense. This view ignores 
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important features of the real world financial markets, such as speculation, noise trading as 
well as other psychological variables which lead to the observed herd behaviour, contagion 
and through these to bubbles. 
Significantly, the role of these variables of mass psychology is fully recognised in 
historical studies of financial markets and financial crises. Kindleberger, a leading financial 
historian suggests that international capital flows have historically been subject to a periodic 
but unpredictable bouts of euphoria and pessimism. Although ignored by the adherents of 
the orthodox model, importance of these psychological factors is also underlined by market 
participants and keen observers. In this context, it is useful to reflect on Alan Greenspan’s 
analysis of the US stock market crash of 1987 and the Asian financial crisis of the late 
1990s. Greenspan observed: 
“At one point the economic system appears stable, the next it behaves as 
though a dam has reached a breaking point, and water (read, confidence) 
evacuates its reservoir. The United States experienced such a sudden change 
with the decline in stock prices of more than 20 percent on October 19, 1987. 
There is no credible scenario that can readily explain so abrupt a change in 
the fundamentals of long-term valuation on that day. Such market panic does 
not appear to reflect a simple continuum from the immediately previous 
period. The abrupt onset of such implosions suggest the possibility that there 
is a marked dividing line for confidence. When crossed, prices slip into free 
fall – perhaps overshooting the long term equilibrium – before markets will 
stabilise.” 
But why do these events seem to erupt without readily evident precursor? Certainly, 
the more extended the risk-taking, or more generally, the lower the discount factors applied 
to future outcomes, the more vulnerable are markets to a shock that abruptly triggers a 
revision in expectations and sets off a vicious cycle of contraction. 
Episodes of vicious cycles cannot easily be forecast, as our recent experience with 
Asia has demonstrated. The causes of such episodes are complex and often subtle. In case of 
Asia, we can now say with some confidence that the economies affected by this crisis faced 
a critical mass of vulnerabilities; ex ante, some were more apparent than others, but the 
combination was not generally recognised as critical.” 
Chang and Singh (1999) combine these perceptions concerning the irrational 
exhuberance and pessimism of the markets with the structural factors present in most 
developing countries to argue that unregulated capital flows are much too risky for these 
economies. The latter are subject to frequent internal and external shocks, including large 
and frequent terms of trade shocks. Moreover, the process of economic development is 
inevitably uneven, producing gainers and losers which often leads to social strife. With the 
knife edge quality of the confidence factor, such strife may panic skittish investors in 
Chicago and New York, not to speak of the rich in developing countries themselves. It is, 
therefore, not at all surprising, to find that capital movements between the rich and the poor 
countries frequently run contrary to the predictions of the orthodox model. Capital does not 
always move from the rich countries where its marginal product is thought to be low 
(because of capital abundance) to poor countries where the marginal product should be 
higher owing to capital scarcity. Thus, we find, that in the recent period savings have been 
flowing from developing countries to the United States rather than the other way round. 
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Similarly, prior to the Asian crisis, the major recipients of capital inflows were Asian 
economies, many of whom did not need these inflows as they already had very high savings 
and investment ratios (for example, Thailand or Korea). On the other hand, the African 
countries, with low savings and investment rates, who really need the capital do not receive 
it under the current regime of largely unregulated capital flows. 
VII. Asian Economic Model and the Crisis 
It has become customary for US commentators to blame the serious financial crisis in 
Asia on the dirigiste model of capitalism which many of these countries have traditionally 
followed. Unfortunately for the crisis stricken countries this view is endorsed, as we saw 
earlier, by Alan Greenspan and other high US officials as well as by the IMF. It is argued 
that, although, the crisis may have been triggered by short term macro economic imbalances, 
its fundamental causes were structural and micro economic. The close relationship between 
the government, the corporations and the banks, it is suggested, led to crony capitalism and 
a disregard of profits in corporate investment decisions. This resulted in over investment 
which together with the high debt-equity ratios of Asian corporations made them highly 
vulnerable to interest rate or exchange rate shocks. Hence the crisis and the IMF policy 
recommendations for the affected countries which require fundamental changes in their 
economic organisation, the relationship between government and business, labour laws so as 
to alter the micro economic behaviour of economic agents. 
The IMF theory, although plausible, is far from being convincing. It has been 
examined at length in Singh (1998, 1999b) and in Singh and Weisse (1999). Other studies, 
notably by Feldstein (1998, 1999) also bear on this thesis. A critical weakness of this theory 
is that it cannot explain why these countries were so extraordinarily successful during the 
last three decades. 
Singh (1999) notes, that the Bretton Woods institutions’ analysis of the Asian model 
have undergone three major transformations between 1991 and 1997. In a major study, 
World Bank (1991), which was supposed to represent what Bank economists had learnt 
from four decades of development experience, it was argued that the outstanding economic 
success of the East Asian countries was due to the fact that the governments followed a 
‘market friendly’ approach to development with only a minimal role of the government. 
Further it was suggested that these nations owed their success to their close integration with 
the world economy. This analysis was sharply challenged by a number of independent 
scholars who pointed out that contrary to the World Bank, the state had played a vigorous 
role in these economies through industrial policies. Moreover, although, these economies 
had export orientation, they continued to maintain extensive import controls. Thus, the 
critics argued that, instead of close integration, the Asian countries had a strategic 
integration with the world economy i.e. they opened up their economies upto the point 
where it was useful for them to do so. 
In response to these criticisms, at the second stage, the Bank’s new study (World 
Bank, 1993) fully accepted that the government had a large role in these economies but 
insisted that the industrial policies were largely ineffective. At the policy level, the Bank 
made no concessions at all, emphasising that the essential lesson of the East Asian 
experience was still to get the prices right and to follow the country’s comparitive 
advantage. However, at the theoretical level, World Bank (1993) represented a major 
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advance in the thinking of the Bank economists. For example, the close business-
government relationships of the East Asian economies were rationalised in terms of the so 
called ‘deliberation councils’ which, it was suggested, in the real world of incomplete and 
missing markets improve welfare by coordinating investment decisions. Similarly, the 
performance standards imposed by these governments on business were interpreted in terms 
of export contests and contingent contracts which were conducive to economic efficiency.
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At the third stage, with the economic crisis in East Asia, it is now being suggested by 
the IMF that the government in these countries intervened too heavily all along which, it is 
suggested was the fundamental cause of the crisis. ‘Deliberation Councils’ are now 
interpreted as crony capitalism. Export contests are, presumably, now regarded as 
distortions to the market mechanism. 
The analysis of the crisis by the authors mentioned earlier comes to rather different 
conclusions concerning the culpability of East Asian model. These conclusions may be 
summarised as follows: 
1. The crisis affected Asian economies, all had, by comparitive international standards, 
strong fundamentals as indicated below: 
 high long-term rates of growth of GDP 
 low, single digit rates of inflation 
 very high domestic savings and investment rates 
 fiscal soundness with low public debt to GDP ratios 
 export orientation and high rates of growth of exports 
2. Although the affected Asian countries had strong fundamentals, they suffered to 
varying degrees from short term imbalances, such as, over-valued exchange rates or 
low value of central bank reserves relative to the country’s short term liabilities. This 
required some macro economic adjustments and re-structuring of debts. However, 
these were problems of liquidity rather than solvency. In view of their long time 
record of fast economic growth and export orientation, all these countries had the 
ability to service their debts in the medium to long term. 
3. IMF’s pronouncements of the period suggesting that the crisis was structural which 
required fundamental changes in the organisation of these economies were unhelpful. 
These panicked the investors and helped convert a relatively minor liquidity crisis into 
a crisis of solvency. 
4. Many of the macro-economic imbalances, as well as, other often-cited instances of 
misallocation of resources ( e.g., the property bubble in Thailand) were not caused by 
too much government interference but by too little. In the period preceding the crisis, 
both Korea and Thailand had undertaken extensive financial liberalisation with the 
result that the government was no longer coordinating allocation of resources. This led 
to over investment in certain sectors and the observed fall in the profitability of 
investment. 
5. It is generally agreed that the proximate cause of the crisis was the sudden reversal of 
the external capital flows to Asian countries. From 1994 to 1996 net private capital 
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inflows to Asian countries more than doubled, rising from 40.5 billion dollars to 90.3 
billion dollars. However, in 1997, there was a net outflow of over 100 billion dollars 
which was equivalent to 10 per cent of the GDP of these countries. The overall 
evidence supports Radelet and Sachs (1998) that this was a classic case of a panic run 
on the bank where each bank considered only the short term illiquidity of the countries 
concerned and consequently withdrew its funds, making the crisis worse for both 
borrowers and lenders. 
6. It is significant that neither India nor China which despite some liberalisation 
maintained extensive capital controls escaped the financial crisis. This is despite the 
fact that the Indian fundamentals were much weaker in those of the crisis-affected 
Asian countries. Further, although China had stronger fundamentals, it had 
nevertheless suffered, in the most recent period, reduced economic growth and 
considerable slowing down of the growth of its exports. 
7. On the basis of the above analysis, Singh (1999b) draws rather different policy 
conclusions from those of the IMF. He suggests that in view of the depth of the crisis, 
the affected countries should not only maintain the close government-business 
relationships of the Asian Model, but, indeed to extend them to involve trade unions 
and other groups in civil society. The crisis is more likely to be resolved by 
cooperation and equitable sharing of the burdens of adjustment rather than by social 
conflict which is likely to follow from introducing at external behest deep structural 
changes in the political and economic organisation of country. 
VIII. Washington Consensus 
At the time of Copenhagen Summit in 1995, the Washington Consensus still held 
sway. Although its chronicler, John Williamson, lists a whole checklist of policies on which 
the great and the good in Washington agreed, its essential points were: a) macro economic 
stabilisation; b) reducing the role of the state in economic activity and enhancing that of the 
market; c) seeking close integration with the world economy through trade liberalisation as 
well as removal of barriers on international capital flows. Many of the issues in relation to 
this subject, that is, the Washington Consensus, are clearly the same as those which arise in 
the discussion of liberalisation and globalisation. Its treatment here will, therefore, be brief. 
The central point of the critics of the Washington Consensus relates to the fact that 
although it may have helped achieve price stabilisation, it has not succeeded in restoring 
long term economic growth. The rate of growth of Latin American economies under the 
Washington Consensus during the 1990s was only 3.2 percent (see table 2), compared with 
a growth rate of 6 percent achieved between 1950 and 1980. Singh (1997) pointedly asked 
that if growth continues to be elusive, at what point would the architects of the Washington 
Consensus concede that the experiment has failed. John Williamson responded by 
suggesting that in view of the fundamental institutional changes required by these policies, 
five more years are necessary to assess the validity of this programme. There is, however, no 
reason to believe the situation will change fundamentally in the next two years when 
williamson’s time limit expires, particularly as all the proponents of the Consensus can offer 
is more of the same. Edwards and Burki, for example, suggest deeper second generation 
reforms, particularly to the labour market to restore economic growth. They, however, admit 
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that such reforms would be much more difficult to carry out than the first generation 
reforms already implemented. 
Singh(1997) put forward an alternative hypothesis to explain the continued slow 
growth in Latin America in the 1990s. He suggested that it was due to the fact that the Latin 
American countries opened up too much and too suddenly to the international economy, 
both in the financial and product markets, and were unable to sustain the desired current 
account ballance at the socially necessary GDP growth rate of 5-6 percent per annum. These 
issues will be taken up further in the final section as they have a bearing not only on the 
Latin American economies but also on developing economies in other regions. 
IX. Meeting the Copenhagan Targets in the new Millenium 
To conclude this essay it will be useful to return to the central policy conclusions in relation 
to Copenhagan Summit which emerged from the analysis of sections III and IV. This 
suggested that in order to achieve and to maintain meaningful “full employment” in 
developing countries in the spirit of Copenhagan with modestly rising productivity and real 
wages, developing countries would need to achieve a trend increase in their growth rates to 
5-6 percent per annum. The discussion of the last three sections has indicated why it would 
be difficult for them to do so in the new millenium under the present institutional 
arrangements of liberalisation and globalisation. 
It is important to reflect on the fact that the main constraints to faster long term growth 
in developing countries, particularly those in Asia and Latin America do not currently lie on 
the supply side. These countries, after all, did achieve such growth rates in the pre-1980 
period as well as in the case of the Asian countries, also subsequently, until the current 
financial crisis. Most of them are better prepared now -- in terms of infrastructure as well as 
human capital -- than before to be able to use the late comers advantage of catch-up. The 
situation may be different in sub-Saharan Africa where years of slow growth may have led 
to considerable deterioration in the infrastructure, but even many of these countries are 
likely to possess better human capital now than before 1970 when African countries were 
growing at a respectable rate of about 5 percent per annum. 
However, these countries are faced today with slow-growing and fluctuating aggregate 
demand. This is due to various factors connected with liberalisation and globalisation which 
have been explained before. As noted, in that analysis, in a regime of unregulated capital 
movements there are important structural reasons why developing countries are likely to be 
subject to stop-go cycles of variable aggregate demand so as to be able to maintain current 
account balance. In a fresh analysis of external constraints on developing countries, 
UNCTAD (1999) suggests that contrary to the expectations of the proponents of 
liberalisation and globalisation, these countries can, today, achieve sustainable current 
account balances only at a much lower growth rates than before. UNCTAD economists 
ascribe this phenomenon to the much greater increase in the propensity to import than in the 
corresponding propensity to export for developing countries following trade liberalisation. 
These countries, are, therefore, much more dependent on external capital inflows to achieve 
desired rates of growth. However, for most countries, under a regime of unregulated capital 
flows, the required inflows are either not available or are subject to wide fluctuations. 
26 
So from the perspective of developing countries, what is required is fast growth of real 
aggregate demand as well as more stable demand (compatible with a sustainable current 
account balance). One way of achieving greater demand is through the application of the 
orthodox prescription of labour market flexibility. This may, however, help increase demand 
in a single country through reduced wages and prices but there is a fallacy of composition in 
the view that this proposition is valid for all countries. For if each country tries to improve 
its competitive position by reducing wages the net result may be the competitive 
devaluations of the kind which occurred in the 1930s and hence even greater instability for 
the international economy. Such a strategy will also lead to a competitive erosion of labour 
standards and would be socially divisive. If both industrial and developing countries 
implemented it, this will pit first-world workers against each other as well as against third-
world workers. 
It is true that under certain conditions greater labour market flexibility may reduce 
fluctuations in aggregate demand. However, by definition, this will be at the expense of 
greater fluctuations in labour market outcomes which may be socially unacceptable in 
themselves. A better method for reducing these fluctuations would be to maintain capital 
controls. 
Similarly, instead of labour market flexibility, a better way to increase the equilibrium 
(i.e. compatible with the country’s sustainable current account balance) rate of growth of 
aggregate demand in developing countries would be to increase exports through greater 
access to advanced country markets. However, in view of the current high unemployment 
rates in many industrial countries, such a proposal may not be practical. An alternative 
proposal which is feasible as well as being Pareto superior is for industrial countries to 
increase the trend rate of growth of real demand in their economies through a coordinated 
expansion. This would both increase employment and/or real wages in industrial countries 
and also lead to an increase in exports and sustainable growth of demand in developing 
countries. It has been suggested earlier that because of the availability of the powerful new 
technology of ICT, whose potential is very far from being realised, the growth of industrial 
countries is also unlikely to be constrained on the supply side. Indeed a faster rate of growth 
of aggregate real demand would lead to a greater and deeper use of the new technology in 
various sectors of the economy. This should result in a virtuous circle of increased demand, 
increased growth of output and of productivity as is normally the case with the introduction 
of new technological innovations. 
However, as emphasised in the Introduction to this essay, industrial countries cannot 
effect a trend increase in the rate of growth of real aggregate demand by simply using 
normal fiscal and monetary policies. In order to be effective and not lead to further 
payments disequilibria between leading industrial countries, it would be necessary for the 
demand expansion to be coordinated. Moreover past experience suggests that there will still 
be some need for restrictive institutional mechanisms at the national level, so that an 
increase in aggregate monetary demand translates itself into an expansion of real demand 
and not just be dissipated by a rise in wages and prices. Thus, despite the recent price 
stability in industrial countries, pay coordinating mechanisms may be necessary to ensure 
that increased aggregate demand does not lead to rising prices. 
To put it in other way, even if one accepts the labour market flexibility doctrine and 
the notion of a negatively sloped demand curve for labour, what is being suggested here is 
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that a rightward shift of the curve is a Pareto superior alternative from which both rich and 
poor countries gain. However, to achieve this expansion in the rate of growth of demand in 
real terms and on a long term basis, important institutional changes (either new institutional 
mechanisms or renewal and rededication of existing ones) will be required.
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Paradoxically, for the reasons outlined earlier, the implementation of this alternative 
policy programme (which would permit developing countries to restrict trade as well as 
capital flows to the desired levels), may also promote greater integration of the world 
economy, particularly through expansion of trade, than under liberalisation and 
globalisation. This is mainly because the rate of growth of world demand and world 
production would be greater in the former case than in the latter. 
X. Conclusion 
The main burden of this essay has been to argue that, in the light of the current trends 
in the world economy, the prospects of meeting the targets of Copenhagan Summit in the 
new millenium under the present institutional arrangements in the world economy are not 
very encouraging. An alternative strategy of a trend increase in world demand through 
coordinated expansion by industrial countries, together with provision for special and 
differential treatment for developing countries in certain spheres, has been proposed instead. 
This would not only help bring full employment with rising real wages in developing 
countries, but also in industrial economies. It would also lead to greater world economic 
integration through faster expansion of world trade than would otherwise be the case. 
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Table 1: Trends in GDP growth: Selected developing regions and industrial 
countries 1965-96 (Average annual percentage growth) 
Region / country 1960-85 1980-89 1990-96 
Low-income economies  
(excluding China and India) 
4.8 2.9 1.4 
China 6.8 10.2 12.9 
India 3.6 5.8 3.8 
Middle income economies 6.3 2.2 0.2 
Latin America 6.0 1.7 3.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.2 1.7 0.9 
South Asia 3.6 5.7 3.9 
East Asia and Pacific 7.3 7.9 9.4 
All low and middle income economies 5.9 3.1 1.9 
High income economies 3.8 3.2 1.7 
US 2.7 3.0 2.5 
Japan 6.6 4.1 1.2 
Germany 3.3 2.2 1.1 
World 4.1 3.1 1.8 
Note: The World Bank defines income groups according to GNP per capita in 1994 as follows:  
Low income $725 or less 
Middle income $8955 or less 
High income $8956 or more 
Source: World Bank (1992, 1996) ; IMF (1996) 
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Table 2: Summary of growth of output and output per capita for advanced economies developing countries and and countries in 
transitions (Ten year averages) 
 1981-90 1991-2000 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
World 3.4 3.1 1.8 2.7 2.7 4.0 3.7 4.3 4.2 2.5 2.3 
Advanced economies 3.1 2.3 1.2 1.9 1.2 3.2 2.6 3.2 3.2 2.2 2.0 
United States 2.9 2.6 -0.9 2.7 2.3 3.5 2.3 3.4 3.9 3.9 3.3 
European Union 2.4 1.9 1.7 1.1 -0.5 3.0 2.4 1.8 2.7 2.8 1.8 
Japan 4.0 1.0 3.8 1.0 0.3 0.6 1.5 5.0 1.4 -2.8 -1.4 
Developing countries 4.2 5.4 4.9 6.7 6.5 6.8 6.1 6.5 5.7 3.3 3.1 
Regional groups            
Africa 2.5 2.8 1.8 0.2 0.7 2.2 3.1 5.8 3.1 3.4 3.2 
Asia 6.9 7.3 6.6 9.5 9.3 9.6 9.1 8.2 6.6 3.8 4.7 
Middle East and Europe 3.0 3.5 2.7 7.0 4.0 0.6 3.7 4.7 4.4 2.9 2.0 
Western hemisphere 1.6 3.2 3.9 3.3 3.9 5.2 1.3 3.6 5.2 2.3 -0.5 
Countries in tarnsition 2.1 -3.2 -7.4 -11.7 -6.4 -7.5 -1.1 -0.3 2.2 -0.2 -0.9 
Output per capita            
Advanced economies 2.4 1.7 0.4 1.2 0.6 2.5 1.9 2.5 2.6 1.7 1.5 
Developing countries 1.9 3.6 2.9 4.1 4.5 4.9 4.3 4.8 4.1 1.6 1.5 
Countries in transition 1.4 -3.2 -7.6 -11.9 -6.5 -7.5 -1.1 -0.1 2.2 -0.3 -1.0 
Source: IMF, 1999 
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Table 3: GDP growth rates in Asian and Latin American Countries, 1955-98 
(Annual percentage) 
 1955-60 1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 1990-95 1996 1997 1998 
Asia         
China - 5.2 5.8 9.5 12.4 9.6 8.8 7.8 
India - 3.4 3.6 5.3 4.5 7.8 5.0 5.8 
Indonesia - 3.9 7.6 5.5 7.0 6.9 3.7 -9.0 
Korea 4.5 8.6 9.5 9.7 7.4 7.1 5.5 -5.5 
Malaysia 4.0 6.5 7.8 5.2 8.7 8.6 7.7 -6.2 
Pakistan 3.4 6.7 4.7 6.3 4.7 5.2 1.3 5.4 
Philippines 4.4 5.1 6.3 0.9 2.2 5.8 5.2 -0.5 
Sri Lanka - 4.6 4.1 4.0 4.5 3.8 6.4 5.3 
Taiwan POC - - - - 6.4 5.7 6.8 4.8 
Thailand 6.8 8.4 7.2 7.6 8.3 5.5 -0.4 8.0 
Median 4.4 5.2 6.3 5.3 6.7 6.3 5.3 -6.9 
Latin America        
Argentina 3.1 4.2 4.4 -0.4 6.0 4.4 8.0 6.0 
Bolivia - 5.2 4.4 -0.1 3.8 4.4 4.2 3.8 
Brazil 5.5 5.4 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.9 3.8 2.7 
Chile 4.0 4.5 6.8 4.1 7.4 6.8 6.4 7.4 
Colombia 3.8 5.1 2.1 3.7 4.5 2.1 3.5 4.5 
Ecuador 4.5 -  2.0     
Mexico 5.9 7.2 5.5 1.0 1.5 5.5 7.1 1.5 
Peru 4.1 4.9 2.2 -0.3 5.5 2.2 7.8 5.5 
Venezuela 6.3 6.0 -0.9 1.0 3.2 -0.9 5.5 3.2 
Median 4.3 5.1 3.6 1.0 4.1 3.6 5.9 4.1 
Source: Singh, 1997; Updated with data from the World Bank (world development reports), various years 
and IMF’s world economic output May, 1999 
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Table 4: World output 1990-98 (Percentage change over previous year) 
Region / country 1990-95
a
 1996 1997 1998
b
 
World 1.9 3.3 3.3 2.0 
Industrialized countries  
of which 
1.7 2.9 2.9 2.2 
United States 2.3 3.4 3.9 3.9 
Japan 1.4 5.0 1.4 -2.8 
European Union 1.3 1.6 2.5 2.7 
Of which      
Euro area 1.4 1.4 2.3 2.8 
Germany 1.7 0.8 1.8 2.3 
France 1.1 1.1 2.0 3.2 
Italy 1.1 0.9 1.5 1.4 
United Kingdom 1.2 2.6 3.5 2.1 
Transition economies -8.2 -1.5 1.4 -1.3 
Developing countries  
of which 
4.9 5.8 5.4 1.8 
Latin America 3.3 3.6 5.4 2.1 
Africa 1.1 3.9 2.7 2.9 
Asia 6.4 7.1 5.8 1.6 
Of which     
China  12.4 9.6 8.8 7.8 
Other countries 5.1 6.4 5.0 -0.3 
Memo item: Developing 
countries, excluding China 
4.0 5.2 4.8 0.8 
Note: a: Annual average, b: Estimated 
Source: UNCTAD 1999 
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Table 5: Growth in developing countries, by Region, 1990-98  
(Percentage change over previous year) 
Region / country 1990-95
a
 1996 1997 1998
b
 
Latin America 3.3 3.6 5.4 2.1 
Argentina 6.0 4.4 8.0 4.2 
Bolivia 3.8 4.4 4.2 4.5 
Brazil 2.7 2.9 3.8 0.2 
Chile 7.4 6.8 6.4 3.3 
Colombia 4.5 2.1 3.5 0.2 
Mexico 1.5 5.5 7.1 4.8 
Paraguay 3.2 1.1 2.4 -1.0 
Peru 5.5 2.2 7.8 0.8 
Uruguay 3.6 5.0 5.0 2.5 
Venezuela 3.2 -0.9 5.5 -0.7 
Africa 1.1 3.9 2.7 2.9 
Algeria 0.4 5.5 1.1 3.4 
Cameroon -1.4 4.0 5.1 5.0 
Cote d’lvoire 1.1 5.2 6.5 5.5 
Egypt 1.4 3.2 5.3 5.5 
Ghana 4.3 5.0 4.3 3.8 
Nigeria 2.7 3.8 3.8 2.4 
South Africa 0.8 2.5 1.7 0.1 
Uganda 7.5 6.0 5.5 4.0 
Zimbabwe 0.8 6.6 3.2 1.0 
Asia 6.4 7.1 5.8 1.6 
Newly industrializing economies 6.9 6.3 6.0 1.8 
Hong Kong, China 5.5 4.5 5.3 -5.1 
Republic of Korea 7.4 7.1 5.5 -5.5 
Singapore 8.5 6.9 7.8 1.5 
Taiwan Province of China 6.4 5.7 6.8 4.8 
ASEAN – 4 7.0 6.9 3.7 -9.0 
Indonesia 7.1 7.8 4.9 -13.7 
Malaysia 8.7 8.6 7.7 -6.2 
Philippines 2.2 5.8 5.2 -0.5 
Thailand 8.3 5.5 -0.4 -8.0 
ASEAN-4 plus Rep. of Korea 7.2 7.0 4.6 -7.3 
South Asia 4.5 7.3 4.7 5.7 
Bangladesh 4.1 5.4 5.9 5.7 
India 4.5 7.8 5.0 5.8 
Nepal 5.0 5.3 4.0 1.9 
Pakistan 4.7 5.2 1.3 5.4 
Sri Lanka 4.5 3.8 6.4 5.3 
West Asia 2.5 5.6 4.8 2.0 
China 12.4 9.6 8.8 7.8 
Note: a= Annual average; b Estimate 
Source: UNCTAD 1999 
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Table 6: Rates of Inflation in Asian and Latin American Countries, 1960-94 
(Average annual percentage growth of consumer price index) 
 1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 1990-94 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Asia         
China - - 5.8 10.8 16.7 8.4 2.8 0.8 
India 7.1 8.5 7.9 10.1 10.2 9.0 7.2 3.0 
Indonesia - 20.5 8.4 7.4 9.4 7.9 6.6 60.7 
Korea 17.4 19.8 5.1 6.3 - - - - 
Malaysia -0.3 7.5 1.6 3.7 3.4 3.5 2.7 5.3 
Pakistan 3.3 13.5 6.7 10.8 12.4 10.3 2.5 7.8 
Philippines 5.8 13.2 14.9 9.6 8.1 8.4 6.0 9.7 
Sri Lanka 1.8 12.6 11.0 9.5 7.7 15.9 9.6 5.0 
Taiwan POC 3.5 12.2 - - - - - - 
Thailand 1.8 9.9 3.3 4.4 5.8 5.9 5.6 8.1 
Median 3.4 12.6 6.7 9.5 8.1 8.4 6.3 7.9 
Latin America         
Argentina 21.7 130.8 395.1 27.6 3.4 0.2 0.8 0.9 
Bolivia 3.5 22.3 318.2 10.9 10.2 12.4 4.7 6.5 
Brazil 46.1 36.7 284.4 1231.5 59.6 11.1 7.9 3.5 
Chile 33.2 185.6 20.5 15.3 8.2 7.4 6.1 5.1 
Colombia 11.9 22.0 24.8 23.8 20.9 20.8 18.5 18.7 
Ecuador - 14.4 36.7 41.0 22.7 24.4 30.6 36.1 
Mexico 3.6 19.3 70.4 13.1 35.0 34.4 20.6 16.7 
Peru 10.4 30.7 233.7 83.0 11.1 11.5 8.5 7.3 
Venezuela 1.3 12.1 19.3 34.2 59.9 94.9 50.0 35.8 
Median 11.1 22.3 70.4 27.6 20.9 12.4 8.5 7.3 
Source: Singh, 1997; Updated with data from IMF World economic outputs various years 
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Table 7: Living standards in East Asia, selected years, 1970-96 






Life expectancy  
(at birth) 
Infant mortality rate  
(per 1000 live births) 
Net primary school 
enrollment (percent) 
Country 1975 1995 1975 1995 1970 1996 1970 1996 1970 1995 
China 568.9* 269.3 60
a
 22 62 70 69 33 76 99 
Indonesia 87.2 21.9 64 11 48 65 118 49 76 97 
Korea, Rep. Of      61 72 46 9 >99 100 
Malaysia 2.1 <0.2 17 <1 62 72 45 11 84 91 
Philippines 15.4 17.6 36 26 57 66 71 37 >99 100 
Thailand 3.4 <0.5 8 >1 58 69 73 34 79 88 
Note: All estimates of poverty are based on $1 per person per day poverty line at 1985 PPP prices. 
a. Data are for 1978 and apply only to rural China 
Source: World Bank 1998c 
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Table 8: Income poverty in developing countries 
Region or Country Group People below the 
poverty line (percent) 
1993 
Number of poor people 
(millions)  
1993 
Arab states 4 11 
East Asia and South East Asia 26 446 
East Asia and South East Asia 
(excl. China) 
14 94 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
24 110 
South Asia 43 515 
Sub-Saharan Africa 39 219 
Developing Countries 32 1301 
Source: UNDP (1997) ; p. 27. 
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Table 9: Human poverty in developing countries (Millions, unless otherwise indicated) 





access to health 
services 
People lacking 
access to safe water 
Malnourished 
children under 5 
Maternal mortality 
rate (per 100,000 
live births) 
People not expected 
to survive to age 40 
 1995 1990-95 1990-96 1990-96 1990 1990s 
All developing countries  842 766 1213 158 471 507 
Least developed 
countries 
143 241 218 34 1030 123 
Arab states 59 29 54 5 380 26 
East Asia 167 144 398 17 95 81 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
42 55 109 5 190 36 
South Asia 407 264 230 82 554 184 
South East Asia and the 
Pacific 
38 69 162 20 447 52 
Pacific 38 69 162 20 447 52 
Sub-Saharan Africa 122 205 249 28 971 124 
Source: UNDP (1997) p. 27 
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0.374 0.412 0.626 0.823 0.729 0.555 0.749 0.856 0.637 
Source: Human Development Report, 1999, p. 224. 
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Table 11: Latin America: Economic Activity, Employment, Wages and 
Poverty, 1980-95 (Annual rates of growth and index) 
Indicator 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Economic activity 
GNP - 0.6 1.9 2.9 
GNP per capita - -1.6 -0.1 1 
Inflation - 134.8 487.5 279.4 
Population and employment 
Population - 2.1 1.9 1.8 
EAP total - 3.5 3.1 2.6 
EAP urban (%) 66.9 70 72.8 75.3 
Nonagricultural employment - 3.5 4.4 3 
Rate of open unemployment 6.7 10.1 8 7.8 
Informality (%) 40.2 47 52.1 55.7 
Public employment (%) 15.7 16.6 15.5 13.6 
Wages 
Real wages in manufacturing 100 93.1 86.8 96.3 
Minimum real wages 100 86.4 68.9 70.1 
Poverty 
Percentage of poor household 35 37 39 - 
Urbanization of poverty - 91.3 82.9 Na 
Source: Tokman (1997) 
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Table 12: Impact of the East Asia crisis on households  
(Using national poverty lines
a
) 
Poverty incidence Indonesia Thailand Korea (urban) 
1997
b
 11.0 11.4 8.6 
1998 19.9 12.9 19.2 
Change in average standards of 
living 1997/1998 (percent) 
-24.4 -13.6 -21.6 
Note: 
a
Poverty lines of around $1/day in Indonesia, $2/day in Thailand and $4/day in Korea. 
b
Poverty incidence for Thailand as of 1996. 
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Table 13: Share of different regions in world manufacturing output since 
1970 (Percentage) 
Country / Region 1970 1980 1990 1995 
Industrialized countries
a
 88.0 82.2 84.2 80.3 
Developing countries of which: 12.0 17.2 15.8 19.7 
Latin America 2.4 4.9 12.0 2.6 
North Africa and West Asia 0.9 1.6 1.8 1.9 
South Asia 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.5 
East Asia
b
 4.2 6.8 7.4 11.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa
c
 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.3 
Note: a Including the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe and also South Africa 
b Including China 
c Excluding South Africa 
Source: UNIDO data base (Kozul-Wright R, 1997) 
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Table 14: Actual and projected regional per capita growth rates 
 Per capita growth rate 
needed to reduce 
Real consumption per capita 
growth rate (%) 
 poverty by half Actual Projectected 
Regions ($1/day) ($2/day) (1991-95) (1997-2000) 
East Asia 1.2 1.9 6.9 2.0 
Europe and Central Asia 0.8 1.2 0.7 0.4 
Latin America and the Caribbean 1.8 2.7 2.0 0.3 
Middle East and North Africa 0.3 1.2 1.1 -1.4 
South Asia 1.3 4.5 1.9 3.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.3 4.5 1.9 3.7 
Source: The World Bank 
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Table 15: Indicators of the growth of international economic activity,  
1964-94 (Average annual percentage changes) 








1964-73 9.2 .. 34.0 4.6 
1973-80 4.6 14.8 26.7 3.6 
1980-85 2.4 4.9 12.0 2.6 
1985-94 6.7 14.3 12.0 3.2 
Source: J. Perraton, et al., “The Globalization of Economic Activity”, New Political Economy, Vol. 
2, No. 2, July, 1997 
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Table 16: Weighted average tariffs by region and sector (Percent) 






Latin America and the Caribbean 
1980-83 (4 – country avg.) 
1984-87 (11 – country avg.) 
1988-90 (9 – country avg.) 














1980-83 (5 – country avg.) 
1984-87 (7 – country avg.) 
1988-90 (7 – country avg.) 














1980-83 (13 – country avg.) 
1984-87 (13 – country avg.) 










Source: Reproduced from Rodrick, 1999 
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Table 17: Weighted average incidence of non-tariff measures by region and 
sector (Percent) 






Latin America and the Caribbean 
1984-87 (4 – country avg.) 
1988-90 (9 – country avg.) 











1984-87 (7 – country avg.) 
1988-90 (7 – country avg.) 











1984-87 (13 – country avg.) 







Source: Reproduced from Rodrick, 1999 
 
 
Table 11a: Labour market indicators for selected Asian and Pacific economies 




force growth rate 
Annual GDP 
growth rate 
Annual rate of 
growth of real wages 
in manufacturing 
 1987 1993 1996 1987-96 1993-96 1987-96 1993-96 1993-97 1997 1990-96 
China 2.0 2.6 3.0 2.2 1.7 1.5 1.1 10.4 8.8 5.5 
Indonesia 2.6 2.7 4.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.7 7.1 4.6 – 
Korea, Rep. of 3.1 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.3 2.5 2.2 7.5 5.5 7.1 
Malaysia 7.3 3.0 2.5 3.8 4.4 3.3 4.2 8.7 7.5 4.6 
Philippines 9.1 8.9 7.4 3.1 3.9 2.9 3.4 5.0 5.1 -2.0 
Thailand 5.9 1.5 1.1 1.7 0.1 1.2 -0.1 5.6 -0.4 3.3 
Source: ILO (1999) World Employment Report 
 
 
